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Abstract 
 
In this paper we present a new simulation model 
designed to evaluate the dependability in distributed 
systems. This model extends the MONARC simulation 
model with new capabilities for capturing reliability, 
safety, availability, security, and maintainability 
requirements. The model has been implemented as an 
extension of the multithreaded, process oriented 
simulator MONARC, which allows the realistic 
simulation of a wide-range of distributed system 
technologies, with respect to their specific components 
and characteristics. The extended simulation model 
includes the necessary components to inject various 
failure events, and provides the mechanisms to evaluate 
different strategies for replication, redundancy 
procedures, and security enforcement mechanisms, as 
well. The results obtained in simulation experiments 
presented in this paper probe that the use of discrete-
event simulators, such as MONARC, in the design and 
development of distributed systems is appealing due to 
their efficiency and scalability. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Modeling and simulation were seen for long time as 
viable solutions to develop new algorithms and 
technologies and to enable the enhancement of large-
scale distributed systems, where analytical validations 
are prohibited by the scale of the encountered problems. 
The use of discrete-event simulators in the design and 
development of large scale distributed systems is 
appealing due to their efficiency and scalability. 
Together with the extension of the application 
domains, new requirements have emerged for large scale 
distributed systems; among these requirements, 
reliability, safety, availability, security and 
maintainability, in other words dependability [1], are 
needed by more and more modern distributed 
applications, not only by the critical ones.  
However, building dependable distributed systems is 
one of the most challenging research activities. The 
characteristics of distributed systems make dependability 
a difficult problem from several points of view. The 
geographical distribution of resources and users that 
implies frequent remote operations and data transfers 
lead to a decrease in the system's safety and reliability 
and make it more vulnerable from the security point of 
view. Another problem is the volatility of the resources, 
which are usually available only for limited periods of 
time. The system must ensure the correct and complete 
execution of the applications even in the situations when 
the resources are introduced and removed dynamically, 
or when they are damaged. The management of 
distributed systems is also complicated by the constraints 
that the applications and the owners of the resources 
impose; in many cases there are conflicts between these 
constraints – for example, an application needs a long 
execution time and performs database operations, while 
the owner of the machine on which the application could 
be run only makes it available in a restricted time interval 
and does not allow database operations. 
In this paper we present a simulation model designed 
to evaluate the dependability in distributed systems. The 
proposed model extends the MONARC simulation 
model [16] with new capabilities for capturing reliability, 
safety, availability, security, and maintainability 
requirements. The model has been implemented as an 
extension of the multithreaded, process oriented 
simulator MONARC, which allows the realistic 
simulation of a wide-range of distributed system 
technologies, with respect to their specific components 
and characteristics. The extended simulation model 
includes the necessary components to inject various 
failure events, and provides the mechanisms to evaluate 
different strategies for replication, redundancy 
procedures, and security enforcement mechanisms, as 
well. The paper extends the results presented in [10], 
introducing the simulation model designed for 
dependability of distributed systems. The results 
obtained in simulation experiments presented in this 
paper probe that the use of discrete-event simulators, 
such as MONARC, in the design and development of 
distributed systems is appealing due to their efficiency 
and scalability. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 
2 presents related work in the field of modeling 
distributed systems, with a special accent on the 
evaluation of dependability. Next we present the 
MONARC architecture. The next sections present the 
simulation model being proposed, together with its 
implementation within the MONARC simulator. In 
section 6 we present the obtained results. Finally, in 
section 7 we present some conclusions and future work. 
 
2. Related work 
 
SimGrid [2] is a simulation toolkit that provides core 
functionalities for the evaluation of scheduling 
algorithms in distributed applications in a heterogeneous, 
computational Grid environment. It aims at providing the 
right model and level of abstraction for studying Grid-
based scheduling algorithms and generates correct and 
accurate simulation results. GridSim [3] is a grid 
simulation toolkit developed to investigate effective 
resource allocation techniques based on computational 
economy. OptorSim [4] is a Data Grid simulator project 
designed specifically for testing various optimization 
technologies to access data in Grid environments. 
OptorSim adopts a Grid structure based on a 
simplification of the architecture proposed by the EU 
DataGrid project. ChicagoSim [5] is a simulator 
designed to investigate scheduling strategies in 
conjunction with data location. It is designed to 
investigate scheduling strategies in conjunction with data 
location. 
None of these projects present general solutions to 
modeling dependability technologies for large scale 
distributed systems. They tend to focus on providing 
evaluation methods for the traditional research in this 
domain, which up until recently targeted the 
development of functional infrastructures. However, 
lately, the importance of dependable distributed systems 
was widely recognized and this is demonstrated by the 
large number of research projects initiated in this 
domain. Our solution aims to provide the means to 
evaluate a wide-range of solutions for dependability in 
case of large scale distributed systems.  
Security in particular has never been properly handled 
by any of these projects before. The only currently 
existing simulator that offers the possibility to evaluate 
security solutions designed for distributed systems is 
G3S (Grid Security Services Simulator) [6]. It was 
developed so as to support various authentication 
mechanisms including X.509 certificates or Kerberos 
tickets and includes mechanisms for disseminating 
security threats, for evaluating various access control 
policies, etc. The simulator is based on the simulation 
model found in GridSim. We too support all the 
mechanisms found in G3S and some others. In addition 
we offer the possibility of evaluating security in a more 
general context, considering the entire context of 
distributed systems, with its specific characteristics.  
An issue here is related to the generic evaluation of 
dependable distributed systems. A fault occurring in such 
systems could lead to abnormal behavior of any of the 
system’s components. For this reason we argue that a 
correct evaluation of dependability in distributed systems 
should provide a complete state of the entire distributed 
system. Because of the complexity of the Grid systems, 
involving many resources and many jobs being 
concurrently executed in heterogeneous environments, 
there are not many simulation tools to address the 
general problem of Grid computing. The simulation 
instruments tend to narrow the range of simulation 
scenarios to specific subjects, such as scheduling or data 
replication.  The simulation model provided by 
MONARC is more generic that others, as demonstrated 
in [7]. It is able to describe various actual distributed 
system technologies, and provides the mechanisms to 
describe concurrent network traffic, to evaluate different 
strategies in data replication, and to analyze job 
scheduling procedures.  
 
3. MONARC Architecture 
 
MONARC is built based on a process oriented approach 
for discrete event simulation, which is well suited to 
describe concurrent running programs, network traffic as 
well as all the stochastic arrival patterns, specific for 
such type of simulations [8]. Threaded objects or "Active 
Objects" (having an execution thread, program counter, 
stack...) allow a natural way to map the specific behavior 
of distributed data processing into the simulation 
program. However, as demonstrated in [9], because of 
the considered optimizations, the threaded 
implementation of the simulator can be used to 
experiment with scenarios consisting of thousands of 
processing nodes executing a large number of concurrent 
jobs or with thousands of network transfers happening 
simultaneously. 
In order to provide a realistic simulation, all the 
components of the system and their interactions were 
abstracted. The chosen model is equivalent to the 
simulated system in all the important aspects. A first set 
of components was created for describing the physical 
resources of the distributed system under simulation. The 
largest one is the regional center (Figure 1), which 
contains a site of processing nodes (CPU units), database 
servers and mass storage units, as well as one or more 
local and wide area networks. Another set of components 
model the behavior of the applications and their 
interaction with users. Such components are the “Users” 
or “Activity” objects which are used to generate data 
processing jobs based on different scenarios. 
 Figure 1. The Regional center model. 
The job is another basic component, simulated with 
the aid of an active object, and scheduled for execution 
on a CPU unit by a “Job Scheduler” object. Any regional 
center can dynamically instantiate a set of users or 
activity objects, which are used to generate data 
processing jobs based on different simulation scenarios. 
Inside a regional center different job scheduling policies 
may be used to distribute jobs to corresponding 
processing nodes. One of the strengths of MONARC is 
that it can be easily extended, even by users, and this is 
made possible by its layered structure. The first two 
layers contain the core of the simulator (called the 
"simulation engine") and models for the basic 
components of a distributed system (CPU units, jobs, 
databases, networks, job schedulers etc.); these are the 
fixed parts on top of which some particular components 
(specific for the simulated systems) can be built. The 
particular components can be different types of jobs, job 
schedulers with specific scheduling algorithms or 
database servers that support data replication. The 
diagram in Figure 2 presents the MONARC layers and 
the way they interact with a monitoring system. In fact, 
one other advantage that MONARC have over other 
existing simulation instruments covering the same 
domain is that the modeling experiments can use real-
world data collected by a monitoring instrument such as 
MonALISA, an aspect demonstrated in [11]. This is 
useful for example when designing experiments that are 
meant to experiment new conditions starting from 
existing real distributed infrastructures. 
Using this structure it is possible to build a wide range 
of models, from the very centralized to the distributed 
system models, with an almost arbitrary level of 
complexity (multiple regional centers, each with different 
hardware configuration and possibly different sets of 
replicated data).  
The maturity of the simulation model was 
demonstrated in previous work. For example, a number 
of data replications experiments were conducted in [8], 
presenting important results for the future LHC 
experiments, which will produce more than 1 PB of data 
per experiment and year, data that needs to be then 
processed. A series of scheduling simulation experiments 
were presented in [8], and [12].  
 
Figure 2. The layers of MONARC. 
In [10] we presented an extension to the model 
designed to simulating fault tolerance in distributed 
systems using MONARC. The solution was able to 
model failures in distributed systems at hardware level 
(abnormalities in the functionality of hardware 
components) or software level (the middleware or 
application deviating from their normal functionality or 
delivery of services). In this we extended on this, 
implementing the proposed model in MONARC, 
evaluating it, but also adding additional mechanisms 
(security, different types of failures, at hardware and 
software levels, to model their occurrences and 
detection, as well as recovery and masking mechanisms) 
to cover a complete set of dependability characteristics, 
in its generic sense. 
The characteristics of large scale distributed systems 
make the problem of assuring dependability a difficult 
issue because of several aspects. A first aspect is the 
geographical distribution of resources and users that 
implies frequent remote operations and data transfers; 
these lead to a decrease in the system's safety and 
reliability and make it more vulnerable from the security 
point of view. Another problem is the volatility of the 
resources, which are usually available only for limited 
periods of time; the system must ensure the correct and 
complete execution of the applications even in situations 
such as when the resources are introduced and removed 
dynamically, or when they are damaged.  
In [10] we proposed an extension to the MONARC’s 
model. In this paper we present the complete model 
designed to consider all aspects of dependability. Figure 
3 presents the components of the dependable modeling 
layer. The extension to the simulation model relates to 
modeling faults appearing inside the modeled distributed 
system. In a distributed system failures can be produced 
at hardware level (abnormalities in the functionality of 
hardware components) or software level (the middleware 
or application deviating from their normal functionality 
or delivery of services). The simulation model accounts 
for both hardware, as well as software failures, modeling 
their occurrences and detection, as well as recovery and 
masking (redundancy) mechanisms [1]. 
 
 
Figure 3. The dependable simulation model and its 
components. 
 
3. Fault tolerance model 
 
At hardware level different distributed components 
can be modeled as failing: the processing unit, the 
network connectivity as well as the storage devices. At 
software level we consider the faults occurring in a 
middleware component (the scheduler behavior could be 
erroneous, the database server could return wrong 
values, etc.) or in the higher-level distributed application 
(for example the jobs could fail to return correct results). 
For all the modeled components being considered by the 
simulation model we added specific mechanisms to inject 
faults. The injection of faults affects primarily the 
behavior of the components. In this way we are able to 
model different faults: crash faults, omission faults, time 
faults, as well as Byzantine faults [1]. In order to cover 
all possible faults, the model includes the use of any of 
two mechanisms, as follows. 
In the first approach the user input into the simulation 
model values for the MTTF (mean time to failure) 
parameter in case of the various components involved in 
a specific simulation experiment. This parameter 
represents the basis for simulating the haphazardness 
stimuli coming from external and internal sources of 
influence that affect the characteristics of the modeled 
components and is seen as a probability measure of fault 
occurrence that is supposedly computed for each 
component prior to its deployment in the system. For 
modeling the fault injection mechanisms we use the 
MTTF together with a mathematical probability 
distribution (such as binomial, Poisson, Gaussian, 
standard uniform, etc). At random intervals of time, a 
component can therefore experience faulty behavior 
(failures), as well as possible recovery. Regarding the 
failures, a component can experience complete crash (the 
component will not recover anymore and will not be 
accessible by modeled entities), omissions (the network 
model will deliver only partial messages for example) or 
delays (the component will experience modeled delays). 
The second proposed approach considers a 
completely random occurrence of fault events, without 
the user specifying any input value. This is useful in 
modeling the most disruptive faults, the Byzantine 
failures that occur arbitrary in the simulated system, such 
as in the case of transient hardware faults for example: 
they appear, do the damage, and then apparently just go 
away, leaving behind no obvious reason for their 
activation in the first place. For these types of errors the 
simulation model allows resuming the normal behavior 
of the affected component, as it is usually enough to 
allow successful completion of its execution.  
The fault injection mechanisms are used together with 
various fault detection and recovery mechanisms. For 
that the model is augmented with a monitoring 
component. The monitoring component is responsible 
with receiving data of interest (such as fault occurrence 
triggered events), taking actions to update the state of the 
distributed system being modeled and possible inform 
interested components of the events occurrences. This 
component can track resource faults in the system and 
generate appropriate controlling actions. For example, 
based on various fault injection mechanisms, we can 
trigger the generation of a crash of a processing unit. The 
trigger translates in the generation of a special simulation 
event that is received by the monitoring component. Next 
the monitoring unit removes the processing unit from the 
modeled system (it will no longer be visible and all its 
on-going tasks will be forced to stop – the state update 
action) and inform all interested components of the 
occurrence of the event. In this approach a scheduler that 
is interesting in monitoring the state of the processing 
unit on which it deployed a task for execution would 
register with the monitoring component and, upon 
triggering of the crash event, will be informed of the 
failure so that to take the appropriate correction actions). 
We actually included in the model (and in the 
implementation in MONARC) an implementation of a 
DAG scheduling algorithm that is capable of taking 
appropriate rescheduling decisions when faults occur. 
Such a component is useful for example when evaluating 
different recovery schemes for distributed systems. 
In this model an omission fault example is the 
simulation of a crushed network link, where the 
monitoring unit is responsible with generating 
corresponding interrupt events for the still-running tasks 
that were using that modeled link. 
For modeling timing faults the monitoring unit also 
plays an important role. In the simulation model the 
boundaries of the action (start of the execution of a task, 
termination of a task, etc.) are modeled using simulation 
events. When the monitoring unit receives a timing fault 
triggering event it will simply modify termination events 
so that to be triggered at a later time in the future. In this 
way we simply change the default behavior so that a task 
will not end when it was supposed to end, but sometimes 
later in the future. A modeled fault-tolerant software 
component could then use timing checks (deadlines) to 
look for deviations from the acceptable behavior. For 
example, the scheduler also implements a fault-tolerant 
mechanism, according to which whenever a new job is 
submitted the scheduler also produces a special 
simulation event that triggers when the timeout occurs 
(where by timeout we mean an amount of time dependant 
on the user specification that will be triggered if the job 
fails to return results in due time). The scheduler will 
then be interrupted by one of two actions: either the job 
finishes or the timeout event occurs (which one happens 
faster in the simulation timeline). The same mechanisms 
are implemented by the network simulation model, a job 
being informed if a transfer failed to finished in a 
specified amount of time (possible due to network 
congestion for example) in order to consider taking 
appropriate measures (such as canceling the transfer for 
example). 
We state that the described extension to MONARC’s 
simulation model is useful for testing both reactive and 
proactive fault tolerance existing techniques [13]. In case 
of the reactive fault tolerant systems the fault monitoring 
systems is informed after the detection of the failure in 
order to start the corresponding recovery processes. The 
predictive (proactive) fault tolerant systems predict a 
fault before its occurrence. Predictive systems are based 
on the assumption that faults do show some disruptive 
effect on the performance of the system. In our approach 
the user can evaluate the performance of the distributed 
system in the presence of various predictive fault 
tolerance techniques by augmenting the monitoring 
component with various prediction algorithms. 
In order to allow the evaluation of a wide-range of 
dependability technologies, the simulation model also 
includes the mechanisms to allow the modeling of check-
pointing or logging of the system’s state. These 
mechanisms are implemented based on the simulation 
events and the state of the objects used to simulate the 
modeled components. For that the job interface provides 
a method that, when called, results in the saving of the 
serialized objects as well as the state of the simulation on 
the local disk storage. This is useful in experiments 
dealing with both static and dynamic check-pointing 
strategies.  
The simulation model also includes the evaluation of 
various replication and redundancy mechanisms. The 
replication provides mechanisms for using multiple 
identical instances of the same system or subsystems and 
choosing the result based on quorum. The simulation 
model allows the simulation of DAG distributed 
activities. This construction is also useful in modeling 
the replication of the jobs, where the same job would be 
executed on multiple processing units and another job is 
used to receive the outputs and select the correct result. 
Redundancy results were demonstrated by the 
experiments described in [8]. In the experiments we 
describe how the simulation model already deals with 
replicating database storages. We also added replication 
mechanism to in case of the simulated jobs and scheduler 
as well. 
 
4. Security model 
 
Distributed systems are more vulnerable to security 
threats than traditional ones due to aspects such as the 
need for distributed access control, remote access to 
resources or the wide spread of resources, located in 
different administrative domains. We present the 
extension to the original MONARC’s model designed to 
consider the evaluation of security in distributed systems.  
In the case of distributed systems the main security 
threats try to exploit the weaknesses of the protocols and 
operating systems underneath them, but also the ones 
exploiting higher levels such as the ones implying attacks 
over databases, file sharing or multimedia applications, 
etc. Therefore, a complete security model must consider 
security aspects ranging from confidentiality of the data, 
authentication, non-repudiation, data integrity, access 
control, as well as key management [14]. 
 
 
Fig. 4. The modeling of virtual organizations. 
 
The starting point in designing the security model was 
the one available in the real-life middleware Globus 
Toolkit [15]. The model allows the definition of virtual 
organizations (VOs), each one can being able to share 
resources belonging to different regional centers. The 
model assumes authentication based on X.509 
certificates, as in case of Globus. The users submitting 
jobs must therefore present a valid certificate used to 
verify their identity within the relation with the different 
entities throughout the modeled system.  
The security model also allows mutual authentication, 
much like in case of GSI [15], for the initial phase of the 
communication. The model considers the default SSL 
mutual authentication protocol. But the security model is 
extensible, allowing for example also the use of 
unidirectional authentication, or the protection of 
messages using a user-defined SSL-like encryption 
protocol. The access authorization to the resources of the 
system is also part of the model, being simulated through 
the use of security policies at the level of components 
belonging to VOs.  
The main mechanisms considered for the security 
model are: the possibility to create virtual organizations, 
security policies for VOs, the use of authentication, 
authorization, the possibility to protect messages using 
cryptographic protocols, to secure data transfer or to 
filter traffic. The proposed model therefore describes a 
wide range of security solutions, such as GSI, PKI, SSL, 
cryptographic solutions, etc., and is adequate for 
modeling attach ranging from DoS to detecting attacks 
using cryptographic messages or authentication and 
authorization protocols, as well as the modeling of 
possible reactions to such attacks. 
 
Fig. 5. The components of the security model. 
In order to implement the model within MONARC all 
basic components were extended (Figure 5): the 
processing CPU unit, the job, the database server, the job 
scheduler – they were all added the mechanisms for 
authentication, access control and job scheduling 
according to the restrictions imposed by the VO where 
the jobs should be executed. 
The secured job identify the job submitted for 
execution within a VO (the default mechanism is based 
on the use of certificate, but other user-defined 
mechanisms can also be used). For that we added the 
possibility to define the VO, as well as added the 
mechanisms for authentication within the system (and 
delegation as well).  
The secured job scheduler schedules jobs for 
execution based on access control policies defined using 
various mechanisms (such as the mapping of certificates 
versus VOs). 
The processing unit was also extended such that to 
specify the VO to which it belongs. By default for each 
VO the secured processing unit has an associated 
security policy and access control method. We actually 
evaluated in different scenarios access control methods 
based on the required processing power or memory 
needed for successful processing. When a job is 
submitted for execution on a processing unit a series of 
tests for the determination of identity and authorization, 
as well as the existence of proper access rights are 
executed. A regional center can have multiple processing 
units, shared within one or more virtual organization, as 
well as processing units that do not belong to any virtual 
organization (not shared within the cloud). 
The database server was also extended to support the 
sending and receiving of secured messages, as well as 
various access control policies defined for the access to 
the data locally stored. In this case the database server 
maintains a mapping between virtual organizations and 
access policies. When one tries to access the data on the 
server a series of tests are being automatically executed, 
having the role of determining the identity and access 
roles and, based on the type of operation and data, 
determine if the user has the right to access the secured 
data or not. Such a mechanism can be used to model 
various types of security access solutions, from 
distributed file systems to user-oriented operating system 
access control policies. 
Also the security model considers the use of 
cryptographic protocols (such as SSL) to encrypt 
communication. Such mechanisms are especially useful 
for ensuring security and confidentiality of the data 
transferred being model within a simulation scenario. 
The user has also the possibility to define its own data 
transfer security protocol, as well as cryptographic 
algorithms being used.  
Finally, in the model we added the possibility of 
traffic filtering (like in the case of firewalls or routers) 
within each component. The filtering is based on rules 
defined statically or dynamically (at simulation time) by 
the user. To complete the model, we also defined a series 
of patterns for attacks (such as DoS), useful for the 
evaluation of various user-defined security mechanisms. 
 
5. Results 
 
In a first series of experiments we evaluated the 
capability of the simulation model to cope with fault 
tolerance solution in different parts of a scenario. We 
first evaluated the capability of producing and recovering 
from failures in the network layer. For these experiments 
we considered a scenario composed of four regional 
centers all connected to each others. Within each 
regional center we considered the existence of a LAN, 
while between the WANs connecting the regional centers 
we assumed the existence of two modeled routers. 
The network traffic was generated so that the packets 
would traverse at least one router. In the experiments 
faults were generated in the LANs, as well as in the 
routers. We were particularly interested in the correlation 
between the number of lost packets in the network and 
the probability coefficients of failures occurrences in the 
intermediary components. 
The retransmission is accomplished by the upper-
level protocols – TCP in this case. In the first experiment 
we simulated the failure of the link port interfaces. When 
the interface experiences transient faults, after several 
attempts, the messages are correctly delivered. The 
results in case of permanent crashes are presented in 
Figure 6. 
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Fig. 6. The influence of modeled failures over a network 
transmission in a LAN. 
 
We next experimented with faults occurring in the 
routers. The failure of one routers leads to an 
interruption in the communication. As in the previous 
experiment, the transient failures only leads to an 
increase in the time needed to transfer the messages, but 
eventually the transmission ends correctly. The influence 
of crash failures is presented in Figure 7. 
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Fig. 7. The influence of modeled failures in a router over 
a network transmission. 
A first series of simulation experiments evaluated the 
fault-tolerant scheduling algorithm for DAGs that is part 
of the model. The experiments considered the case of 
several complex DAG dependent tasks that were 
submitted for execution, and the cases when faults occur 
or not. We first analyzed the report between the finalized 
versus submitted tasks for both cases. 
We conducted these experiments on the conditions 
and algorithms proposed in [12]. The results are 
presented in Figure 8. 
In figure 8 the difference between the submitted jobs 
and the finalized ones represents the number of jobs that 
were successfully rescheduled (when faults occurred). 
An experiment designed to evaluate the security 
model considered the case of two regional centers 
(Figure 9) sharing several processing units and a 
database server within a virtual organization. The 
purpose of this scenario was to demonstrate the 
functionality of an access policy within the secured 
database server and to identify flows within the model. 
 
Fig. 8. Results obtained when evaluating the fault-
tolerant scheduling algorithms – the case of running the 
CCF, ETF and MCP scheduling algorithms [12]. 
 
For this simulation experiment we defined two jobs: 
one requests the creation of a database and writes data in 
it and the other one connects to the server and requests 
the data matching a specific pattern. 
 
 
Fig. 9. The scenario configuration. 
We associated a security policy resembling the UNIX 
file access policies to the database server belonging to 
the VO. We next considered that the members of the VO 
have read and write rights over the database server. Any 
get operation will be ignored and the operation is 
considered an implicit attack on the database server. 
The experiment consisted in the insertion of many 
jobs of the types previously presented. The obtained 
results, presented in Figure 10, demonstrate that, as 
expected, during an attack the throughput increases, in 
contrast with the initial conditions of the experiments. 
Also, the number of received connections increases 
during an attack. The results demonstrate the validity of 
the proposed security model, as they are well mapped 
with the analytical results expected from the experiment. 
We also conducted a number of other experiments, trying 
to evaluate the components proposed within the security 
model, ranging from securing communication to 
imposing access control at virtual organization level. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Results obtained in case of the security 
simulation experiment. 
6. Conclusions 
 
As society increasingly becomes dependent of 
distributed systems (Grid, P2P, network-based), it is 
becoming more and more imperative to engineer 
solutions to achieve reasonable levels of dependability 
for such systems. Simulation plays an important part in 
building and evaluating dependable distributed systems.   
In this paper we presented a new simulation model 
designed to evaluate the dependability in distributed 
systems. This model extends the MONARC simulation 
model with new capabilities for capturing reliability, 
safety, availability, security, and maintainability 
requirements. The model has been implemented as an 
extension of the multithreaded, process oriented 
simulator MONARC, which allows the realistic 
simulation of a wide-range of distributed system 
technologies, with respect to their specific components 
and characteristics. 
The extended simulation model includes the necessary 
components to inject various failure events, and provides 
the mechanisms to evaluate different strategies for 
replication, redundancy procedures, and security 
enforcement mechanisms, as well. The results obtained 
in simulation experiments presented in this paper probe 
that the use of discrete-event simulators, such as 
MONARC, in the design and development of distributed 
systems is appealing due to their efficiency and 
scalability. 
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